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L'anorexie, comme maladie de la fin du dix-neuvieme siecle, comprend un
enorme corps d'ecriture. A travers son propre corps et son corps
d'ecriture, Soros interprete l'anorexie comme un sympt8me de la
medicalisation de la vie. Le regard medical-avec ses lectures de
sympt8mes et la langue de la maladie - offre Cl l'anorexique un
vocabulaire complet qui lui permet de comprendre son corps qui diminue;
illui donne une technologie de famine; illui dit ce qu'dle est. A travers
l'analyse de la force performative du discours de Judith Butler, Soros
argumente que le diagnostique et la maladie de l'anorexie arrivent sur
scene simultanement pour ecrire la naissance du corps anorexique dans
l'existence. Le texte de Soros passe d'une analyse Cl la troisieme personne
sur la presentation de l'anorexie comme une maladie, Cl une description Cl
la premiere personne sur la subjectification d'une adolescente comme
anorexique. Elle decrit comment son corps anorexique aete ecrit dans
l'existence par des histoires circulant dans son ecole secondaire, dans des
rapports en classe de psychologie, et dans des films Cl la television. La
pratique de citation que la maladie met en oeuvre, ou " les comportements
et les identites signifient Cl soi et Cl l'autre seulement paree qu'ils repetent
un code reconnaissable", conduit Soros au jeu de mot provocateur
"L'anorexie est une maladie transmissible textuellement. "
Given the physical emaciation which defines anorexia nervosa, it is
ironic that the disorder has such a full body of writing. The name is
cited in thousands of books and articles and thousands of case studies.
Each individual performance of the disorder is situated within this
body of texts through a complex citational practice which physically
performs the name's truth. This citational practice reveals both the
name's vulnerability and its productive power. While the doctor says
flesh with a name, the anorexic says a name with her flesh.
But how does this saying occur? How does a doctor's name
present a disease? How does anorexia nervosa become itself?
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The term "iatrogenic" describes an illness caused by the medical
system. Ivan Illich clarifies in Limits to Medicine that while in the
narrow sense "iatrogenic" is used only for diseases that "would not
have come about if sound and professionally recommended treatment
had not been applied" (27), the term more generally describes the
multiple afflictions that arrive through the effect of the medical system,
what he calls the "medicalization of life." Illich focuses on such issues
as injuries received while undergoing medical treatment, contagious
diseases caught while staying in a hospital, and unnecessary surgery
caused by a doctor's drive to diagnose and cure even when no illness is
apparent. But perhaps more significantly, he also argues that "lifelong
medical supervision ... turns life into a series of periods of risk, each
calling for tutelage of a special kind" (78). As medical knowledge maps
the body, the modem subject learns to access herself through a web of
medical practises, diagnoses and threats.
I read anorexia nervosa as a symptom of this medicalization of life,
a sign of the effects of modem medical tutelage. The anorexic literally
embodies a clinical gaze. Although there is some continuity between
medieval forms of self-starvation and anorexia, with modem sufferers
often describing their acts as holy and their flesh as sinful, the two
practices in fact reveal a radical discontinuity. Whereas medieval
starvation enacted a religious discourse, modem starvation enacts a
medical one. Medical discourse does not simply create a difference in
how the behaviour is interpreted, but in how it is performed. Whereas
saints flagellated their flesh, anorexics compulsively exercise. Whereas
saints wore hairshirts, anorexics encircle their waists with tape
measures. Whereas saints allowed only the host or wine to pass
through their lips, anorexics count calories, choosing their food by
number. Religious practices are replaced by medical ones as anorexics
appropriate new techniques, instruments, measurements, words.
Modem medical technologies and vocabularies create a distinct form
of self-starvation. The practice of measuring the use of calories
becomes possible once the precise energy consumed by individual
exercises is established. The practice of comparing oneself to an
abstract physical norm becomes possible with the development of
weight charts cited regularly to students, mothers, patients. The
practice of repeatedly weighing oneself becomes possible with the
production of the home scale, an instrument created at the beginning of
the twentieth century, making no bathroom complete without a piece
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of the doctor's office. As the century proceeds, scales for food become
popular in modern kitchens. Lists of nutritional contents become
widely available, printed on the obsequious packaging of mass
production and marketing. Sugar replacements, amphetamines,
laxatives, diuretics, enemas, emetics: this list of anorexic secrets reads
like the inside of a doctor's office or of a bathroom medicine cabinet.
Modern medicine teaches the anorexic how to control food and
measure the body. The broad dissemination of medical knowledge
and technology gives anorexia its vocabulary, its tools, its techniques,
its success.
But medical discourse and technologies do more than deliver a set
of acts to the anorexic. They also tell her what she is. Once someone is
diagnosed as sick, she is structured within a fixed set of expected
behaviours and roles, given a medical identity:
Usually the danger of routine diagnosis is even less feared than
the danger of routine treatment, though social, physical, and
psychological torts inflicted by medical classification are no
less well documented. Diagnoses made by the physician and
his helpers can define either temporary or permanent roles for
the patient. In either case, they add to a biophysical condition a
social state created by presumably authoritative evaluation.
When a veterinarian diagnoses a COWlS distemper, it doesn't
usually affect the patient's behaviour. When a doctor
diagnoses a human being, it does. (Illich 89)
Although Illich describes medicine's influence on a patient's social
behaviour, he still posits an ostensively prediagnosed "biophysical
condition"-a disease which exists before its definition. What I am
interested in exploring, however, is the possibility of a more complex
form of medical production, a sliding between diagnosis and disease,
between description and prescription, between word and thing. A
sliding where sickness does not pre-exist its treatment but arrives with
it, diagnosis and disease appearing with their shared name.
This sliding between word and thing is evident in the ambiguity of
medical terminology. When a patient first consults a doctor in a
hospital, she is said to "present" herself or to "present" the symptoms
(Hunter 58). When a doctor later describes this patient's affliction in a
pedagogic venue, surgical debriefing or departmental meeting, the
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doctor is described as "presenting" the patient. What does it mean that
the same word is used both for the patient's narrative and for the
doctor's, both for the appearance of the patient and the description of
her? This ambiguous use of the word-one term dividing itself in half
as it refers to two ostensibly distinct acts-suggests that the appearance
of a diseased patient and the doctor's narration of the disease threaten
to fold together. Two times-the present of the patient's appearance
and the present of the doctor's description-begin to collapse into one
another, each present failing to signify as itself. The doctor "presents"
the patient as if his narrative could make her appear, as ifher original
presentation were not original but given by his delivery, like a past
arriving from the future. She presents herself, but is not fully present
until the doctor presents her in her absence. His description, folded
around this absence, is always in some sense performative, giving that
which it describes, presenting what is not yet there.
In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler analyzes the performative force
of discourse, arguing that an acknowledgement of discourse's
productive ability does not entail denying the matter of the body.
Rather, it demands rethinking materiality as "the effect of power, as
powers most productive effect" (2). She elaborates that subjectivity is
not outside of or before discourse, but is given through it, through a
complex interpellation that is never complete. This conception of
power does not negate the possibility of human agency nor does it
construct the subject as an individual who freely chooses amongst a
number of possible subjectivations. Subjectivation, Butler argues, is
not a single act, but a process, a series of ritualized repetitions, each
iteration reaffirming the power of discourse as it reveals points of
instability and potential failure. Self and body arrive together through
a process of discursive accretion: "the formulation of a bodily ego, a
sense of stable contour, and the fixing of spatial boundary is achieved
through identificatory practices" (14). At stake in such a reformulation
of identity and materiality is:
the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic of
power, such that the matter of bodies will be indissociable from the
regulatory norms that govern their materialization and the
signification of those material effects ... the understanding of
performativity not as the act by which a subject brings into being
what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of
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discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and
constrains ... [and] a rethinking of the process by which a bodily
norm is assumed, appropriated, taken on as not, strictly speaking,
undergone by asubject, but rather that the subject, the speaking "I,"
is formed by virtue of having gone through such a process... (3)
To conceive of discourse as a contagion that somehow infects and
determines the actions of individual human subjects or to theorize
language as something that imprints itself on an always passive matter
is to divest the subject of the agency involved in interpellating a
constitutive discourse. Likewise, to construct the subject as a free agent
outside of discourse's power is to overlook how the subject itself is
created through the discourse it interpellates. Either presumption
reasserts a subject/object binary and negates the complexity of
subjectivation. Understanding how discourse matters demands
thinking of the meridian between subject and object, active and
passive, exploring that thin line which manifests itself so evidently in
this entity called"anorexia nervosa."
But if one of the productive effects of modern medical discourse is
anorexia nervosa, why is it that so many modern subjects are not
afflicted with the disease? To say that a discourse is productive is not to
imply that it is deterministic nor to claim it as the sole influence in a
process of subjectivation. Even the most powerful discourse does not
have a monopoly. Moreover, as Butler argues, each discourse has its
constitutive outside which always threatens to return, disrupting its
process of signification. A performative utterance is always encrypted
with potential failure and slippage. A word remains haunted by its
inability to deliver a referent. A diagnosis haunted by what it can't say.
In the case of anorexia nervosa, multiple discourses matter. The
development of the bourgeois family, the rise of consumer capitalism,
the effectiveness of modern misogyny and the pervasiveness of the
media's promotion of the thin female body-all these structures play
instrumental roles in the development of the disease. And given that
the mouth is an eroticized boundary in Western culture, a highly
charged orifice that opens the self to the other and the other to the self,
any disorder involving the mouth is encrypted within a complex
psychoanalytic economy. Each anorexic is an individual cathexis of
multiple influences. By arguing that medicine has a performative
effect, I do not intend to discount other strands of influence or to posit a
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conspiratory intent, but to suggest possible explorations of how
medicine interacts with what it says it is not. As a meta-diagnosis-a
diagnosis of those who diagnose--an exploration of medicine's
productive role will reveal that specialists presenting an illness are not
outside its presentation.
"Anorexia Nervosa." Like most adolescent girls, I knew how to
pronounce the Latin term. By the early eighties, it had slipped into
mainstream vocabulary, functioning as a diagnosis, a compliment, and
an insult: "You look anorexic," girls were pre-emptively informed
when their bodies refused to develop as quickly or as fully as the
others. In these statements, part of the name always went missing. It
divided in half, "anorexia" floating by itself, as ifwaiting for something
to arrive. The single word alone enough to signify such a thin referent.
The listener knew what it meant when it wasn't all there.
The year I turned sixteen, The Best Little Girl in the World, a novel by
the psychologist Stephen Levenkron, was passed from friend to friend
at highschool as it hurried towards its status as a best-seller. This
novelized case study with its detailed description of anorexic rituals
and thought patterns was adapted into a prime time television movie. I
watched the movie while eating popcorn, feeding the starving actress
by feeding myself. That year I gave a presentation on anorexia to my
Psychology class, holding up the inevitable pictures and charts,
reading aloud the exercises, measurements, calories. A few months
after I presented, I began fasting every second day, folding the week
like a paper fan, one day of food matched with one of hunger, presence
and absence pressed back to back as I steadily decreased the amount I
let in. I carved my flesh away, dividing myself as diligently as I
divided the week. Losing half my body weight, I split in two. I
presented anorexia.
My self-starvation was not an act, in either sense of the term. It was
not an individual action but a form of ritualized repetitions. It was not
a fraud, a set of behaviours I could discard if I so desired, but a painful
trap I had somehow set and did not know how to escape. The above
narrative presents too simply an over-determined experience. My
behaviour was established within a complex dynamic of family
violence and intergenerational memory, contradictory gender
expectations and conflicting desires. The disorder enabled me to
negotiate this matrix. I did and did not know what I was doing.
While I remained pleased at my ability to exercise control over my
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body, revising and correcting it like a written assignment, I became
ashamed and angry that others could so easily identify me, the
transparency of my body telling them how I ate, what I was. But
despite this awareness and discomfort with this new identity, I could
not stop the vertiginous loss. Just as understanding that gender is a
construction does not enable one to step outside its productive power,
knowing the name of the disease did not help me to stop saying it with
my flesh.
"She's anorexic," people whispered to each other on the bus,
delighted and horrified to see a walking specimen. "You are anorexic,"
students and teachers accused me at school, the word"are" replacing
"look," identity replacing resemblance. The declaration was stated as
firmly as if saying it would make it so. The act of hailing functioned as
a promise or a threat. The constative became performative. The
repetition-from doctor, psychologist, nurse, counsellor, teacher,
parent, sibling, neighbour, friend-made the name stick. My
behaviour became more rigid and extreme as I embodied-or
disembodied-the word. But the repetition also suggested that the
identity was not as secure as my appearance seemed to reveal. I was in
danger of failing to present. I had to be told what I was.
But what was I? Just as Levenkron blurs the genre between case
study and novel, my research blurs the boundary between medical
rhetoric and memory. I can't access a disorder that has not been
interpellated by medical and psychological diagnosis. I can't reach a
memory of self-starvation unmediated by a doctor's story. Perhaps
this very failure constitutes the truth of the disease.
In this sense, my self-starvation was an act, if not consciously willed
as such. I did not create or experience the disorder independent of the
descriptions 1'd read. I learned the lines and performed them well.
This performance was a process of subjectivation: I was not outside the
act, choosing and manipulating the part I played, but was given
through it. Hilda Bruch, a renowned specialist on anorexia nervosa,
bemoans the increase of"copy cat" anorexia or "me too" anorexia, and
distinguishes this behaviour from that of the "real" anorexic who
arrives on her own (Golden Cage xii). But Butler argues that no such
original self-delivery exists. Power is "not the function of an
originating will, but is always derivative" (13). Subjectivation is
citation. Individual statements, behaviours and identities signify to the
self and to the other only because they reiterate a recognizable code.
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The mistake of assuming that the subject is the sole and separate
instigator of her acts occurs when the discourse being repeated and the
act of repetition are not recognized as such. The subject is seen as
originator "to the extent that the citational practice by which he/she is
conditioned and mobilized remains unmarked" (13). This citational
practice must remain unacknowledged if the etiology of anorexia
nervosa is to retain its status as an entity discursively separate from the
productive power of its diagnosis.
If constative statements are always in some sense performative,
then the doctor isn't outside the patient and diagnosis is never free
from the possibility of being copied. Medical discourse is cited through
the ritualized repetition of anorexia, each article and book presented
through individual acts. Each sufferer hailed with a pathological
identity as she repeats what she already knows. Anorexia Nervosa is a
textually transmitted disease.
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